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PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Julius Chambers*
FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH. By

Michal Belknap. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. xv,

387. $35.
[T]he Southern states have made their policy clear. States' rights, they
say in effect, include the right to abrogate power when it involves distasteful responsibilities, even to the Constitution of the United States, its
amendments, and its judicial interpretation. So the power and the responsibility return by default to the federal government. It is up to all
branches of the central government to accept the challenge.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 1958. t

With these words, Marnn Luther King, Jr. implored the federal
government to safeguard the constitutional rights of its citizenry.
Since the Reconstruction era, Whites had lynched, murdered, and terrorized Blacks in order to maintain a system of racial segregation and
domination. King believed aggressive federal leadership was necessary
to protect the black population against further violation of its civil
rights and to overcome the often violent forms of resistance to change
in the South. 2
In Federal Law and Southern Order, Michal Belknap suggests contrary conclusions. Belknap argues first that federal intervention in the
1960s played but a minor part in the cessation of anti-civil rights terror. He specifically discounts the impact of United States Justice Department prosecutions in the Price 3 and Guest 4 cases and the passage

* Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. B.A. 1958, North
Carolina College; M.A. (History) 1959, University of Michigan; J.D. 1962, University of North
Carolina; LL.M. 1963, Columbia University. - Ed.
Special thanks to Marianne Engelman for her contribution.
1. M.L. KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 198 (1958).
2. Id.
3. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price and seventeen
others were indicted under a federal criminal statute for willfully denying three civil rights workers their right to due process under the fourteenth amendment. James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman had been traveling from Meridian to Philadelphia, Mississippi,
when they were stopped, assaulted, and brutally killed. Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in the case, which found sufficient state involvement to justify conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1964), defendants were found guilty and received sentences of three to ten years.
4. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Two klansmen accused of murdering black
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 5 Instead, Belknap attributes decreased racial violence to restraints imposed by Southern political culture. "Fearful of a breakdown of law and order in their
communities," Belknap writes, "southerners had themselves assumed
responsibility for controlling and punishing racist violence" (p. 229).
In making these arguments, Belknap underrates the federal government's vital role in securing civil rights in the South. 6 The national
government's retreat from civil rights enforcement following Reconstruction and relinquishment of responsibility to state and local officials led to lawlessness, lynching, and the entrenchment of
segregation. 7 Only when the federal judiciary, Congress, and the Justice Department began to actively protect civil rights was progress
made in combatting racial violence and discrimination. 8
Belknap further contends that constitutionally required principles
of federalism precluded the national government from effective civil
rights enforcement. Despite calls throughout the 1950s and early
educator Lemuel Penn were prosecuted under federal civil rights law after they were acquitted in
state court. The Supreme Court reversed a district court dismissal of charges of conspiracy to
interfere with the exercise of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. As
Belknap indicates, the Price and Guest decisions removed all doubt about whether the Justice
Department possessed the legal authority to prosecute perpetrators of anti·civil rights violence.
P. 183.
Belknap credits the Supreme Court decisions in Price and Guest with clarifying the potential
powers of the national government, but devalues the significance of these legal developments to
progress in the South. Belknap offered a similar argument in an earlier article, The Legal Legacy
of Lemuel Penn, 25 HOWARD L.J. 467 (1982). According to Belknap, Penn's death led to a
federal apparatus better equipped to handle civil rights violations. Belknap argued, however,
that increased federal capabilities were anachronistic by the late 1960s because changes in South·
em attitudes largely eliminated the need for national involvement. For an opposing view of the
importance of Price and Guest, see M. BERRY, BLACK REsISTANCE/WHITE LAW: A HISTORY
OF CONSTfI1JTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 200-04 (1971).
In addition, Belknap's assessment of the Price and Guest decisions conflicts with his central
theme, that those who argued that constitutional principles of federalism limited the authority of
the national government to intervene in the South have been vindicated. Belknap fails to resolve
this contradiction. For a more complete discussion of the tension between Belknap's argument
for the vindication of restricted federal authority and his uncritical treatment of the articulation
and exercise of federal power to enforce civil rights, see infra note 18.
5. Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title I, § lOl(a), 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 245) (criminal statute that prohibited any individual, whether acting under authority of law or
not, from interfering with the exercise of the right to vote or the right to participate in activities
administered by the United States government).
6. This review does not intend to address fully the impact of internal, cultural constraints on
the transformation of race relations. Nevertheless, Belknap's argument that white southerners
themselves curtailed violence out of concern for law and order is not persuasive. Belknap's dis·
cussion provides no account for why law and order concerns emerged in the mid-1960s and had
not prevented racial violence at earlier times. Without explanation, he downplays the influence
of federal intervention, the civil rights movement, and the pressure of national attention. Pp.
229-51. National pressure and even force were necessary to achieve state acceptance of civil
rights enforcement responsibilities, as well as citizen respect for and compliance with the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in the area of race relations.
7. See generally M. BERRY, supra note 4, at 103-73.
8. For a discussion of the progress made in civil rights enforcement in the twentieth century,
see infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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1960s for federal protection by leaders such as Dr. King, and despite
explicit refusals by state authorities to comply with constitutional
guarantees of equal protection,9 federal officials were reluctant to act.
The national government, writes Belknap, was paralyzed by the belief
that under federalist precepts law enforcement responsibility rested
with the states. 10 Although he criticizes successive administrations for
using federalism as an excuse for passivity (p. 250), Belknap fails to
assess the extent of the government's power to intervene and the degree to which principles of state sovereignty or autonomy limited the
exercise of federal prerogatives. Belknap asserts that decreases in
overt forms of racial hostility in the South vindicated the view held by
Justice Department officials that the federal government could not,
and should not, try to substitute for the failure of local law enforcement to safeguard civil rights (pp. ix, 250-51). Belknap thus suggests
that the national government's immobility in the face of flagrant civil
rights violations and state abdication of enforcement responsibility
was ultimately justified.
Yet quite the opposite is true. The Constitution imposes on the
federal government the obligation to ensure that the civil rights of all
citizens are protected. The government's failure to act contravened
this constitutional charge. The first section of this review will address
the nature of the federal government's constitutional mandate to protect civil rights, focusing on its development during Reconstruction;
the second section will recount how well that mandate has been
fulfilled.
A.

The Federal Mandate to Protect Civil Rights

Belknap treats federalism, the division of power between national
and state government, as a static, rigid concept, ignoring its constitutional evolution since the eighteenth century. Without discussion of
either competing conceptions of federal-state relations, or their historical development, Belknap effectively adopts a narrow, if vague, definition of federalism in general consonance with the views expressed by
Burke Marshall during his tenure at the Justice Department. "There
is no substitute under the federal system for the failure of local law
9. The state legislatures of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Virginia passed resolutions formally repudiating the Supreme Court's decisions relating to segregation and declaring their intention not to abide by desegregation orders.
See 1 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 437-47, 591, 753, 948 (1956); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Pp. 39, 73-76, 105. For an account that contrasts with Belknap's sympathetic description
of the Justice Department's dilemma, see M. BERRY, supra note 4, at 237. Berry dismisses the
claim that principles of federalism truly constrained government officials, noting that by 1965, it
"became clear that the problem had not really been a constitutional one after all; the Constitution had merely been interpreted to support the disinclination of whites to regard blacks as
persons."
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enforcement responsibility," Marshall wrote in 1964. 11 According to
Belknap, Marshall's federalism not only required deference to state
and local law enforcement, but deprived the national government of
the powers needed to protect citizens in the face of Southern inaction
(pp. 73-75). Federalism thus constituted an inflexible limit upon the
powers of the national government, denying the executive branch the
ability to safeguard the exercise of constitutional rights in the 1950s
and 1960s. At best, federalism afforded aggrieved parties the opportunity for case-by-case vindication in federal court (pp. 74-77).
Belknap's account of federalist principles explicitly relies on what
he considers to be the contemporary understanding during the 1960s
(pp. xi-xii). Indeed, in the early 1960s, Burke Marshall accepted a
conception of the federalist system bereft of the flexibility accorded it
by Reconstruction, a conception forged in 1787 and resurrected in the
service of the nation's retreat from civil rights protection after 1876. 12
Belknap fails to mention, however, that Marshall's restrictive idea of
federal power was itself controversial. Marshall's contemporary opposition included not only activists who expected the national government to intervene to protect civil rights for reasons of morality,
without due regard for the structure of government, but also those
with more expansive views of federalism. 13
As Belknap deftly describes, Marshall's account of the constitutional dilemma facing the Justice Department in the 1960s set federalist constraints against the need for adequate protection of civil
rights. 14 Marshall believed that the division of powers required by the ·
Constitution compelled the national government to rely on state and
local authorities to enforce the law. For the record, however, Marshall did express frustration with the Justice Department's remedial
approach, which was limited to the slow and costly process of litigation.15 He felt new legislation was a necessary prerequisite to more
11. P. ix (quoting letter from Burke Marshall to Professor Russell H. Barrett, January 3,
1964).
12. See B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) [hereinafter B. MARSHALL];
Marshall, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights,. 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 455 (1962);
Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, SI VA. L. REv. 785 (1965).
13. See Wasserstrom, Book Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 406, 410 (1966) (reviewing B. MARSHALL, supra note 12) ("The limitations [Marshall) imposes on federalism are in several respects
unnecessary. And it is this that makes his book so troublesome ...•"); Comment, Theories of
Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1008 (1966) ("[F)ederalism is a more complex
mechanism. . . . So understood, the objectives of federalism support intervention in today's deep
South.").
14. P. 75; see also B. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 81 ("Those who say that civil rights issues
cut into the fabric of federalism are correct."). Belknap argues further that President Kennedy
shared Marshall's conviction that federalism precluded government action: "When confronted
with demands for remedial action to correct the inadequacies of southern law enforcement, the
White House readily pleaded that 'the role of the Federal Government 'in our constitutional
system •.. is limited.'" Pp. 173-74.
15. B. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 34-38. Belknap's presentation of Marshall's point of
view deemphasizes Marshall's anguish and contrasts sharply with the sentiments expressed in
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extensive executive action. Yet, although Marshall conceded that
some measure of enhanced federal civil rights responsibility was constitutionally permissible and that Congress was vested with the authority to enact appropriate legislation, he remained deeply disturbed
by the federalism problems he considered inherent to federal intervention.16 While Marshall did not elucidate the outer boundaries of congressional power, he indicated that legislative authority was limited
and that additional steps taken by the Justice Department to enforce
new civil rights laws would conflict with federalist principles. 17
Belknap, following Marshall, thus assumes that constitutional
principles of· federalism obliged the federal government to restrain
from acting more forcefully to protect civil rights. 18 This construction
denies federalism its rich texture and flexibility and contravenes its
constitutional history. The national government was not powerless to
prevent the pervasive racial violence and discrimination suffered during the 1960s. To the contrary, the three branches of the federal government had both the authority and a constitutional mandate to
protect the civil rights of its citizenry. 19
The Reconstruction amendments20 to the Constitution revolutionized federalist precepts that had been established at the nation's foundMarshall's book. Belknap describes Marshall's commitment to restrictive notions of federalism
as paramount. In the short run, reliance on southern institutions often meant exposing persons
involved jn the civil rights movement to attack, writes Belknap, "but Marshall believed their
plight was the result of a temporary breakdown in southern law enforcement which would last
for only a few years." P. 74. In fact, the problem was not so easily resolved for Marshall.
16. B. ·MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 39-40, 81, 83-84.
17. Pp. 126-27; see also B. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 34-37, 72-75, 81-82.
18. While Belknap's understanding of the nature of federalism is similar to Marshall's, Belknap's book, as well as his earlier article, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern
Legal System and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93 (1984), attempt
to evaluate the suitapility of the federalist structure to the problem posed by Southern violence.
Without exploring alternative interpretations ·offederalist theory, Belknap at times criticizes Justice Department officials for using federalism as an excuse for inaction. P. 250. Belknap fails to
resolve the tension between this implicit approval of the exercise offederal power to enforce civil
rights and his endorsement of nonintervention as a constitutional principle.
Although never precisely elucidated, Belknap's federalism thus seems to allow for some
greater level of legislative, iµid consequent executive, action than the federalist theory which he
attributes to Marshall. Belknap concedes that the Constitution allocates to the federal government a measure of power to create remedies for-civil rights violations. P. 250. However, he fails
to delineate the outer boundaries of this constitutional authority. Furthermore, his uncritical
tre;itment of congressional civil rights J_egislation and actions finally taken by the Justice Department suggests an implicit recognition that the federal government is empowered to protect the
rights of its citizenry under the Constitution.
In contrast, Belknap maintains throughout the book that responsibility for the protection of
civil rights rests with state and local authorities. Without resolving the underlying contradiction
in bis argument, Belknap claims that, in retrospect, the Justice Department's narrow construction of the federal government's powers and reliance on state and local authorities for civil rights
enforcement were vindicated.
19. For a discussion of resp,onsibilities imposed by Recpnstruction amendments, see infra
notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
20. U.S CONST. am~nds. XIII, ~· and XV.
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ing. The dramatic events of 1860 through 1876, including the
secession of the Southern states, the battles and dislocations of the
Civil War, the demise of slavery, the Emancipation Proclamation, and
Presidential and Radical Reconstruction, forever changed the constitutional landscape of the United States. During Reconstruction, the
American people, led by the Republican Party, transcended the dayto-day discourse of normal politics and participated in a historic moment ofreconstituting the nation's fundamental principles.21 The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution created a
national citizenry, defined the rights of citizenship, and authorized the
national government to protect those rights. 22 The American people
thus constitutionally23 transformed the structure of federalism. 24
The framers 25 of the Reconstruction amendments meant to vest in
the federal government the authority necessary to secure civil rights
21. See generally E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877 (1988) (exceptionally comprehensive history of the Reconstruction era).
For a discussion of the process undertaken during Reconstruction of legitimate Constitutional creation, in which the American people spoke on matters of basic principle in a particularly authoritative way, see Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1049
(1983).
22. A large body of literature addresses the nature and meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965) (informed by abolitionist
concepts, the framing of the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated national citizenship, substantive rights, and national responsibility for the protection of federal rights); H. HYMAN, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE
CoNSTITUTION 424-29, 436, 449 (1973). Recent historical work affords new insight into the
breadth of post-war constitutional change. See, e.g., R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDI·
CIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985) (appreciation for national civil rights enforcement authority under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments commonly shared by members of judiciary); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L,
REV. 863 (1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism] (framers believed in
primacy of national citizenship and vested primary authority for securing civil rights in Congress); E. FONER, supra note 21, at 258-59 (discussing implications of the fourteenth amend·
ment). But see Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the
Era of the Founeenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221 (1987).
23. U.S. CONST. art. V.
24. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 239 (describing fourteenth amendment as effecting "a
revolution in federalism by nationalizing the natural or civil rights of men or citizens"); H. HYMAN, supra note 22, at 467 (Reconstruction worked "profound alterations in nation-state relationships"); H. HYMAN & w. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 386 (1982) (fourteenth amendment was "a basic alteration in our
federal system") (quoting the Supreme Court in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972)).
But see Maltz, supra note 22.
25. This discussion of the intentions and beliefs of the framers does not constitute an endorsement of theories of judicial interpretation based on "original intent." Nevertheless, careful
study of the Reconstruction era is crucial to full appreciation for the development and complexity of federalism. Returning to the historical record for information on Reconstruction is unusually important because, as Thurgood Marshall wrote in 1954, history rewrote and distorted the
script of Reconstruction. See Marshall, Segregation and Desegregation, in II THE VmcE OF
BLACK AMERICA 252 (P. Foner ed. 1975).
Neither do the words that follow create a complete portrait of the Reconstruction amendments. They are, instead, intended to outline the constitutional transformation of federalism.
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and to provide federal remedies when those rights were denied. 26 Debated during the final months of the Civil War, the thirteenth amendment was intended to give constitutional sanction to the new
arrangement of power between the federal government and the states.
Critics of the amendment claimed that it was an unprecedented, unwarranted extension of national power. 27 Opponents further complained that the amendment would authorize federal intrusion both to
prevent the reemergence of physical bondage and to advance the rights
of the freedmen. 28 Indeed, advocates believed that the amendment
would empower the federal government to guarantee not only the abolition of slavery but also the privileges and liberties of freedom. 29
The historical record shows that contemporaneous interpretations
of the thirteenth amendment assumed that the constitutional change
would authorize federal protection of civil rights. Before the thirteenth amendment was ratified, Congress considered a civil rights bill
designed to nullify discriminatory laws and regulations. 30 Senator
John Sherman of Ohio, a proponent of the bill, counselled his colleagues to postpone passage until the ratification of the thirteenth
amendment. 31 Whereas congressional power to enforce civil rights
was uncertain in 1865, the framers believed that the adoption of the
thirteenth amendment would provide .authority for the legislation.
Referring to the pending amendment, Sherman explained, "Here is
not only a guarantee of liberty to every inhabitant of the United States,
but an express grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by
appropriate legislation."32 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Ohio, who
had managed the thirteenth amendment in the Senate, concurred. According to Trumbull, the thirteenth amendment authorized federal
protection of the rights essential to freedom. 33
The thirteenth amendment encompassed more than the authoriza26. For detailed discussions of which rights were to be protected, see Jacobus tenBroek's
seminal work, EQUAL UNDER LAw, supra note 22; Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins. of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235, 275-77 (1984). But see Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 867 n.12.
27. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 160-62.
28. Id. at 162.
29. Id. at 162-73; see also H. HYMAN, supra note 22, at 429; H. HYMAN & w. WIECEK,
supra note 24, at 402-03.
30. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 39 (1865).
31. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,. supra note 22, at 895.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 41 (1865).
33. Id. at 43. According to Trumbull, .the rights essential to freedom included freedom of
movement, the right to acquire and hold property, and the right to make and enforce contracts.
Proponent James Harlan, a senator from Iowa, believed that the amendment also authorized
the federal government to protect against discriminatory restrictions on family relations, freedom
of speech, and the right to a fair hearing in criminal proceedings. Thus while the thirteenth
amendment was clearly intended to abolish the incidents of slavery, the outer contours of the
rights to be protected were subject to a range of opinion. See, e.g., E. FONER, supra note 21, at
66-67.
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tion of federal protection of civil rights. It accorded all citizens an
affirmative guarantee of liberty. Congressional Republicans, generally,
interpreted the thirteenth amendment's guarantee to include the rights
to life, liberty, and property. 34 Senator Trumbull invoked the authority granted by the thirteenth amendment in support of the subsequent
civil rights bill he introduced into the Senate. Trumbull's bill, which
was to become the Civil Rights Act of 1866, attempted to fulfill the
promise of the new amendment. 35 The constitutional prohibition
against slavery and involuntary servitude, Trumbull explained, "declared that all persons in the United States should be free. This measure intended to give effect to that declaration and secure to all
persons within the United States practical freedom." 36
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reflected the profound change in federalism wrought by the Civil War and constitutionalized by the thirteenth amendment. 37 Congress attempted to outlaw the many forms
of subjugation and discrimination, public and private. 38 Section one of
the Act granted particular rights i.Ildependent of state law. In addition, the Act circumscribed the states' rights to settle property, con34. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1780-81; see also Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 898-99 n.1S6.
3S. The belief that the Civil Rights Bill was authorized by the thirteenth amendment was
almost universal among influential Republicans. See E. FONER, supra note 21, at 244-4S.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
37. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 898-99.
38. The Supreme Court recently heard arguments on whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was intended to bar private acts of discrimination. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No.
87-107 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 1988). Until recently, the Civil Rights Act's prohibition on private
racial discrimination had long been treated as settled law. In 1968, the Court held in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. that section 1 of the Act was designed "to prohibit all racial discrimination,
whether or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein - including the
right to purchase or lease property." 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976). The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 makes clear that Congress aimed to prohibit racially discriminatory actions by both public and private parties. In its
effort to identify the problems that faced the freedman, Congress relied upon information from
the Schurz Report, the hearings of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and letters and peti·
tions. Congress repeatedly heard testimony about the abuses suffered by the freedmen at the
hands of private persons. Carl Schurz, for example, reported on the often violent efforts by
private citizens to re-enslave, coerce, and intimidate the freedmen. See Report of Carl Schurz on
the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, S. EXEC. Doc. No.
2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 17, 19-20 (186S). Testimony before the Joint Committee demonstrated, in addition to the discriminatory administration of state criminal laws, the need for the
Freedmen's Bureau to assure fair private employment contracts and for Union troops to prevent
violations by private individuals of the property rights of those loyal to the Union. See Report of
the Joint Comm. on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at xvii (1866). The Civil Rights Act
was the embodiment of the congressional response to these reports, and was a call for federal
action. The Republicans attempted to bar the effective reinstatement of a system of oppression,
whether or not the perpetrators used the official machinery of the state. See Kohl, The Civil
Rights Act of1866. Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., SS VA. L. REV.
272, 28S-93 (1969). But see Maltz, supra note 22, at 221 (an act regulating private relations
would have been inconsistent with the political conditions in 1866, which included a common
desire to minimize the presence of the federal government); Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875:
Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 873 (1966).
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tract, and some criminal disputes when such arrangements
contravened statutory stricture. 39 Congress enumerated the rights of
freedom and created a cause of action in federal court for their enforcement. 40 Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is evidence of the
revolutionary nature of the thirteenth amendment. As this implementing legislation makes clear, the framers believed the amendment
would sanction a dramatic change in federal-state relations. 41 As
Trumbull said in December 1865, "I consider that under the constitutional amendment Congress is bound to see that freedom is in fact
secured to every person throughout the land .... "42
Fearing a repeal of the Civil Rights Act, or an attack on its constitutionality, 43 congressional Republicans sought to reaffirm explicitly
the grant of authority to the federal government and the guarantee of
liberty to all citizens.44 The fourteenth amendment was designed to
make certain the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, regardless
of pre-war federalism and doctrines of states' rights. When Congress
acted on the fourteenth amendment, it intended to address the overwhelming need for federal protection of the freedmen's rights. The
mandate of the fourteenth amendment was clear: citizens were entitled to equality before the law and the national government was
charged with civil rights enforcement.45
The fourteenth amendment inscribed into the Constitution the
post-war transformation of federalism. Republicans translated info
constitutional law a conception of national citizenship which included
rights the states could not abridge. 46 Henceforth, the states were required to respect the fundamental rights of all citizens,47 provide due
process,48 and accord the equal protection of the laws. The fourteenth
39. See H. HYMAN, supra note 22, at 449 (the novelty of Reconstruction was "in the admission of a national role in intrastate rights protections").
40. Section three of the Act, 14 U.S. Stat. 27 (1866), conferred jurisdiction on the federal
courts to enforce section one rights.
41. See generally E. FONER, supra note 21, at 244-45.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 77 (1866). For a fuller discussion of the congressional debates over the legislation intended to implement the thirteenth amendment, see J. TE1'fBROEK, supra note 22, at 174-97.
43. The framers of the fourteenth amendment were concerned that courts would restrictively
interpret the thirteenth amendment to include only the abolition of slavery, eliminating authorization for the protection necessary to give meaning to freedom. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 910.
44. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 201; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,
supra note 22, at 910-11; E. FONER, supra note 21, at 253, 257.
45. See E. FoNER, supra note 21, at 256-57.
46. See id. at 258; see also J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 94-115 (development of paramount national citizenship in abolitionist theory).
47. For a discussion of which rights the framers believed were fundamental to citizenship, see
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 913-37; J. TENBROEK, supra
note 22, at 201-39.
48. The Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights. For recent additions to the debate over incorporation, see Curtis,
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amendment made the branches of the federal government directly responsible for ensuring, protecting, and vindicating the civil rights
guaranteed to individuals. The enabling clause conferred upon Congress the authority to enforce the rights secured.49 As Representative
John A. Bingham of Ohio succinctly declared, "the powers of the
States have been limited and the powers of Congress extended."50 Yet
this provision constituted more than mere authorization. It was a
mandate to enforce the amendment. While voluntary compliance by
states and private actors was to be encouraged, and was to some extent
expected, the framers deemed federal protection necessary to give real
meaning to the amendment's guarantees. 51 An 1874 speech by John
Mercer Langston made manifest expectations raised by guarantees of
federal protection: "I would justify the claim of the colored American
to complete equality of rights and privileges upon well considered and
accepted principles of law," Langston said. The Reconstruction
amendments to the Constitution, he continued, "are national utterances which not only recognize, but sustain and perpetuate our freedom and rights."52
B. Fulfillment of the Mandate

One century ago, in the waning days of Reconstruction, Frederick
Douglass denounced the federal government for abandoning its obligation to protect the rights of federal citizenship. 53 He assailed the claim
that constitutional limitations on the powers of the federal government
required abdication of the responsibility to enforce civil rights to the
states. If the general government had the power to grant citizenship
and the ability to extend the franchise, Douglass argued, it also had
the right to protect that citizenship and to safeguard the exercise of
that franchise. Douglass declared: "If it has this right, and refuses to
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill ofRights, 14 CONN. L. REv. 237 (1982) (argument for
incorporation); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648, 650 (1966)
(quoting Ex parte Virginia 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880)).
50. Quoted in E. FONER, supra note 21, at 258.
51. See E. FONER, supra note 21, at 259.
52. Langston, Equality Before the Law, in 1 THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 25,
at 442, 446. The fifteenth amendment was the third constitutional change during Reconstruc·
tion intended to empower the federal government to sweep away the system of involuntary servi·
tude and its vestiges. Approved by Congress in 1869 and ratified one year later, the fifteenth
amendment prohibited federal and state government entities from denying any citizen the right
to vote on account of race. Once again, Congress was explicitly authorized to enact implement•
ing legislation. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. With the addition of the fifteenth amendment, the
Constitution guaranteed that no person would be denied registration or turned away from the
ballot box because of racial discrimination. The founders pledged that this promise would be
enforced by the instrumentalities of the federal government.
53. Douglass, I Denounce the So-Called Emancipation as a Stupendous Fraud, in 1 THE
VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 25, at 562.
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exercise it, it is a traitor to the citizen. If it has not this right, it is
destitute of the fundamental quality of a government...." 54 Nevertheless, the narrow construction of federalism adopted in the aftermath of Reconstruction and maintained well into the twentieth
century denied the federal government the powers necessary to protect
basic civil rights. 55
Efforts to remove racial discrimination and interwoven problems
of caste from American life have often been thwarted. The collapse of
Reconstruction in 1876 gave rise to decades of racial violence, segregation, and unrestrained discrimination. During this period, state and
local authorities not only sanctioned but also engaged in the use of
force for purposes of racial control. 56 Congress and successive administrations ignored pleas for enforcement of constitutional guarantees. 57
Beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases, 58 the Supreme Court nullified or effectively curtailed many of the civil rights the Reconstruction
Republicans thought they had secured. 59 For many years tlie federal
S4. Id.
SS. For an account of the post-Reconstruction abandonment of civil rights, see R. LoGAN,
THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 19S-241 (1965).
The Supreme Court restricted legislative jurisdiction over and judicial protection of civil
rights by adopting narrow positions in each of two interpretive debates: (1) Answering the questions which rights the fourteenth amendment protected, the Court held in the Slaughter-House
Cases that only those rights owing their existence to the federal government were in the purview
of the amendment; 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); (2) Attempting to define the reach of federal
protection under the fourteenth amendment, the Court imposed a state action requirement for
the application of fourteenth amendment protection; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
For discussion of new evidence that the framers of the Reconstruction amendments intended to
grant Congress authority to protect fundamental rights regardless of the source of the infringement, see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 869. For support of
the state action theory, see Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crimes Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 317 (1968).
56. In the opening pages of the book, Belknap recounts the horrible history of post-Reconstruction racial violence and government complicity. Pp.· 1-26.
57. See generally R. LoGAN, supra note 55, at 23-105; M. BERRY, supra note 4, at 103-37.
Even during the nadir of federal enforcement, advocates of civil rights looked with hope and
expectation to the promise of federal protection. Calling for federal remedies for lynching in
1909, Ida Wells-Barnett stated, "Let us undertake the work of making the 'law of the land'
effective and supreme upon every foot of American soil - a shield to the innocent; and to the
guilty, punishment swift and sure." Wells-Barnett, Lynching, Our National Crime, in 2 THE
VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA, supra note 25, at 71, 75.
58. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
S9. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (invalidating§§ 3 and 4 of the Civil
Rights Enforcement Act of 1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (restricting
reach of§ 6 of Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870); Hall v. DeCuir, 9S U.S. 485 (1878)
(invalidating Louisiana anti-discrimination statute); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882)
(striking down penalties imposed by Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating§§ 1and2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565 (1896) (limiting protection against discriminatory exclusion from jury service); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" public facilities); Williams v.
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (jury service); Cummings v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusal to reconsider Plessy). See generally H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK,
supra note 24, at 474-78, 487-89, 495-97, 500-06; R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 22, at 143-59; R.
LoGAN, supra note 55, at 105-25.
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government forsook its obligation to enforce constitutional rights.
The government's failure to exercise the authority conferred by the
Reconstruction amendments contributed to the growth and entrenchment of segregation, discrimination, and inequality, and permitted unrestrained racial violence.
In the 1930s, the all-out assault on segregation and racial discrimination began. 60 Increased legal pressure, acts of civil disobedience,
and a changing national climate provided the impetus for federal action. 61 Civil rights organizations and individuals, working through
the courts and participating in political demonstrations, began to
break down barriers to the free exercise of the franchise, fair employment, and the desegregation of educational and other institutions. In
Brown v. Board of Education, 62 the Supreme Court declared segregated schools unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment,
thereby heralding a new era of constitutional interpretation. Brown
indicated the Court's willingness to recognize and enforce the constitutional guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Regrettably, Justice
Department officials in the aftermath of Brown relied on local law en:.
forcement for the protection of constitutional rights even when it was
clear that local authorities would fail to demand compliance. 63 The
policy of patient trust in local institutions was not ultimately vindicated. Racial violence in the South - bombings, murders, and acts of
arson intended to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights - was
tragic evidence of the injuries suffered by the practice of noninterven.:
60. For a narrative of the development of the legal attack on Jim Crow, see R. KLUGER,
(1976).
61. See M. BERRY, supra note 4, at 175-239.
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. Judicial recognition of constitutional guarantees placed ultimate responsibility for civil
rights enforcement with the three branches of the federal government. As Belknap describes,
however, the Justice Department in the Eisenhower administration failed to fulfill its enforcement obligation, even resisting intervention when state and local authorities openly defied federal
court orders. Pp. 26-40. Justice Department officials claimed they lacked authority to become
more involved in civil rights enforcement and to combat anti-civil rights violence. Civil rights
legislation, officials said, was necessary to empower the executive department to protect constitu·
tional rights. Pp. 40-44. Nevertheless, after Brown, the executive branch of the federal govern·
ment, charged with the responsibility to carry out the law of the land, was once again obliged to
protect rights guaranteed during Reconstructioi;i and now recognized by the Court.
In 1964 Burke Marshall finally acknowledged that state repudiation of and resistance to fed·
era! court orders necessitated federal enforcement activities. In Federalism and Civil Rights,
Marshall recounted the historical development of the caste system in the South in the aftermath
of Reconstruction. B. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 51. He recalled that the Supreme Court's
unequivocal declaration that Jim Crow was unconstitutional had been met with no general com·
pliance. Marshall noted that the federal government is invested with the responsibility above all
to ensure that none are indifferent to federal law and that court orders are enforced. Obstruction
of federal law by the states required federal action. In order for the executive to enforce civil
rights laws, Marshall concluded, "it is necessary to create again, by statute, federal rights and
federal remedies, in a new effort to rid the nation of discriminatory practices." Id. at 83. For
Marshall's account of the constitutional dilemma facing the Justice Department, see supra notes
14-17 and accompanying text.
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tion. Justice Department prosecutions in the Price 64 and Guest 65
cases demonstrated a greater executive commitment to battling at least
the most virulent methods used to deprive citizens of their rights. 66
By the mid-1960s, Congress, too, began to accept its responsibility to
safeguard the rights secured by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 moved the
country closer to the promise of equality.
.
At the end of Federal Law and Southern Order, Belknap concludes, "The federal response to anti-civil rights violence was not too
little, but it did come too late." 67 However, evidence that federal action was sufficient is unconvincing. While Congress, the executive
branch, and the courts took steps to protect the exercise of constitutional rights against flagrant and some subtle forms of invasion, 68 the
constitutional mandate to ensure the rights of citizenship is still unfulfilled. Society is moving toward a deeper appreciation for t~e _great
promise of equality and the flexibility of the .system of federalism, yet
protection of civil rights remains inadequate. ID.deed, gains made in
the 1960s and 1970s in assuring equal rights for IIJ.embers of minority
groups and for the disadvantaged in our society have been threatened
in the past decade. 69 The nation has experienced a retrenchment. The
Justice Department today fights to dismantle affirmative action policies and school desegregation programs, rather than targeting discrimination and inequality. 70 Unfortunately, efforts to curtail and even
reverse civil rights progress have already met with some success. 71
64. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
65. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
66. In addition, decisions in the two cases strengthened the two federal civil rights laws at
issue, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) (punishing conspiracies to deprive citizens of their rights) and 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1964) (punishing deprivation of rights under color of law). Pp. 159-82.
67. P. 250. Here Belknap is once again unclear as to whether or not he believes that constitutional principles of federalism limited the power of the national government. If the federal government possessed the authority to intervene and protect against anti-civil rights violence, earlier
Justice Department reliance on state and local law enforcement cannot be exonerated on constitutional grounds.
68. As Belknap states, "Extralegal violence against blacks was a bulwark of the southern
system of white supremacy, and even those white southerners who refrained from such conduct
themselves were disinclined to punish those who did engage in it" P. 1. Just as racial violence is
inextricably bound to the larger system of oppression to which it contributes, the federal response
to lynching and physical forms of civil rights violations should be viewed in the context ·of federal
protection of civil rights generally. Steps taken to check racial violence, however helpful in
preventing immediate harm to the person, are inadequate if they merely alter the type of discrimination suffered and fail to address the underlying problems of inequality and racial intolerance.
69. Swinton, Economic Status ofBlacks, 1987, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1988, 130
(1988).
70. See N. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988); Chambers, The Law and Black Americans: Retreat from Civil Rights, in THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA 1987, at 15 (1987); CITizENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990s (1989).
71. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (establishing "intent" standard for
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Tragically, minorities still suffer the effects of centuries of racial
subjugation. The United States remains scarred by economic and social inequality based on race. Racial isolation, impoverishment, limited opportunity, and inferior education, medical care, and housing
compromise the lives of black Americans today. Even a quick scan of
the facts reveals unconscionable inequity. For example, a child's quality of life all too often correlates with the race of his or her parents.
Compared to white children, black children are approximately twice
as likely to be born prematurely, live in substandard housing, and die
within the first year of life. 72 Over forty percent of black children live
below the poverty line. 73 Indeed, poverty increased significantly over
the last decade due in part to the increased number of poor families
receiving little or no government assistance. 74
It is disgraceful that from the moment of birth so many minority
citizens are met by the grim realities of poverty, 75 isolation76 and diminished opportunity. 77 Indeed, America still falls short of offering
equal educational and employment opportunities. Illiteracy plagues
the disadvantaged. 78 Black students who complete high school are
equal protection analysis); Mccleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (finding a study showing
racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty insufficient to show unconstitutional discrimination); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989) (invalidating Minority
Business Utilization Plan).
72. See CHILDRENS' DEFENSE FUND, KEY FACTS (1986). In 1985, the mortality rate of
black infants was a shocking 18.2 deaths per 1000 live births; the rate for Whites was 9.3. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsrRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at 75, 76
(1987) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABsrRACT].
In addition, black children are more than two times as likely to be born to teenage mothers,
suffer low birth weight, and lose their mothers during childbirth. The maternal mortality rate for
black mothers rose to 20.4 per 100,000 live births in 1985, the most recent year for which statistics are available. Id. at 62, 63, 75. Significantly, black mothers are more than twice as likely to
receive late or no prenatal care. In fact, black Americans visit physicians less frequently than
Whites generally. Id. at 95.
73. Id. at 435. A disproportionately high percentage of Hispanic children, 37.1in1986, are
also in poverty. Id.
74. S. DANZIGER, Recent Trends in Poverty and the Antipoverty Effectiveness of Income
Transfers, in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICIES 33, 41 (S. Danziger & K.
Portnoy eds. 1988); see also s. DANZIGER & D. WEINBERG, FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT
WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T (1986).
75. Black Americans are disproportionately subjected to the horrors of crime. Black citizens
are more likely to be victimized not only by crimes against the person, but also by burglary and
larceny. Black males are almost six times more likely to die by homicide than are their white
counterparts. Black females are more likely to be victims of homicide than white males, and
more than three times more likely than white females. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 72,
at 81, 160, 163.
76. Racial isolation remains a prevalent condition in the 1980s. Notably, two of every three
minority students at the elementary and secondary levels attend schools in which minorities
account for more than fifty percent of the student body. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1985, at 132 (1984).
77. The average life expectancy at birth for Whites is 5.8 years longer than for Blacks. In
1986, the life expectancy at birth of white females was 78.9 years; of black females, 73.6; of white
males, 72.0; and of black males, 65.5. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 72, at 70.
78. Approximately forty percent of minority youths are said to be functionally illiterate. See
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less likely to enroll in college79 or to be employed. 80 Unacceptably
high unemployment rates worsen the already discouraging outlook for
black youth. 81 Disproportionately high unemployment afflicts even
those who have beaten the odds by completing four or more years of
college. 82 For many of those struggling to overcome the obstacles, the
promise of equality seems illusory. s3
Although inequity is still embedded in the societal structure of this
nation, civil rights laws have eroded the forces of discrimination. As
Belknap is quick to emphasize, most Americans no longer countenance flagrant racial violence {pp. 229, 248-50). Black Americans
have toppled racial barriers, creating_ access to educational institutions, employment opportunities, and the political arena. There have
been numerous, hard-earned victories. Successes have resulted from
civil rights activism, litigation, and the enactment and enforcement of
federal and state civil rights Jaws. The dramatic increase in the
number of black elected officials across the country is one notable example. Yet despite these advances, Blacks still hold fewer than 1.5
percent of elective offices in the United States, 84 and analysts caution
that the rate of growth in the number of Blacks elected to office has
substantially slowed. ss
These conditions cry out for action by the federal government.
They plead for reexamination of programs, policies, and procedures by
the Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary to ensure that all
citizens are treated fairly and have an equal chance to life. Recent
government civil rights policies dominated by principles of self-help
and voluntary compliance have exacerbated rather than improved the
problem. They threaten the limited economic gains made by Blacks
during the 1960s and 1970s and have contributed to the deterioration
of opportunities in housing and education. 86 In order for progress to
N. Francis, Equity and Excellence in Education, in AssOCIATION OF BLACK FOUNDATION EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 73 (1985).
79. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 72, at 140.
80. Id. at 139.
81. More than one-third of black teenagers in the labor force are unemployed. -The overall
civilian unemployment rate for Blacks is double that for Whites. Id. at 37, 365, 381. Inequities
in job classification and pay scale levels, as well as assets, should also be taken into account. See
id. at 365-67, 430, 482. Individual, family, and household income levels are marked by considerable disparity. In 1986, for example, the per capita money income of $7207 for Blacks contrasted
sharply with that for Whites, $12,352. See id. at 37, 394, 422-23, 425-27, 429-30, 432.
82. The unemployment rate for Blacks who completed at least four years of college is more
than twice that for Whites. Id. at 382.
83. As John Jacob of the National Urban League commented, "black teenagers ... see the
dream did not work for their kin and have no reason to believe that it will work for them."
Jacob, An Overview of Black America in 1985, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1986, at i.
84. JOINT CENTER FOR PoLmCAL STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL
ROSTER 1 (1986).
85. Id. at 1, 5.
86. See Swinton, supra note 69.
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be made, the federal government must become more active in civil
rights advocacy and enforcement. 8 7
The onerous, unyielding obstacles faced by the disadvantaged in
our society must be dismantled. The enormity of this task argues for
reassessment of the exclusion of the poor from the purview and protection of the fourteenth amendment. 88 The indignity of discrimination
suffered by minorities today also necessitates review of the intent requirement presently imposed on individuals seeking equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 89 The constitutional mandate to
safeguard the rights of freedom demands congressional attention and
strict civil rights enforcement. The federal government has an obligation not only to protect citizens against blatant, violent invasions of
their constitutional rights but also to ensure that individuals are not
denied basic opportunities because of entrenched, structural inequality. The legal legacy of the Reconstruction era demands no less.
Reconstruction transformed relations between the nation, the
state, and the individual. The history of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments demonstrates that Congress intended the national government to possess the authority to secure the status and rights of
American citizens. In the post-Reconstruction years, however, the
government abdicated its responsibility to safeguard constitutional
guarantees of freedom and equality, exposing Blacks in the South to
violence and intimidation and licensing segregation and racial discrimination. Belknap criticizes the Justice Department's use of federalism
as a pretext for quiescence, yet he fails to offer an alternative account
of the division of powers between the federal government and the
states. This omission is dangerous. By ignoring constitutional development in the Reconstruction era and, thus, the complexity of the federalist system, the nation risks accepting excuses for inaction. Failure
to appreciate the breadth of our constitutional heritage encourages
misconceived toleration of continued discrimination and inequality.
Events of the past three decades do not vindicate policies of inaction.
Progress in the fight against racial violence, discriminatory practices,
and inequality has been achieved when the federal courts, Congress,
and the executive have undertaken civil rights enforcement responsibilities. Indeed, recent experiences confirm the importance of federal
leadership in the struggle for civil rights.

· 87. For example, the effort to eliminate entrenched patterns of racial discrimination in em·
ployment has been undermined by lax enforcement and counterproductive policies. See Leo·
nard, The Effectiveness of Equal Employment Law and Affirmative Action Regulation, 8 RES. IN
LAB. EcoN. 319 (1987) (originally published as National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 1745 (1985)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Chambers,
supra note 70, at 21-27; Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 70.
88. See San Antottio.School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. See Washington y. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

